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The European Mind-set, European Opinion and Economic Developments in 2007–2017: Major Changes of Public Opinion and the European Mind-set in 2004–2018

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# The European Mind-set, European Opinion and Economic Developments in 2007–2017: Major Changes of Public Opinion and the European Mind-set in 2004–2018

**Jari Kaivo-oja, Theresa Lauraéus**

Finland Future Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku



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## Abstract

The purpose of the study: This study reports the major changes in public opinion in the European Union. The first part of the study includes citizens' assessments of the most important issues facing the EU at the moment.

The second part of study reports the changes in (1) national economic situation evaluations, (2) European economic situation evaluations, (3) European economic crisis recovery evaluations (the impact on the crisis on jobs), (4) evaluations of euro-optimism vs. pessimism, (5) evaluations about the support for the euro area and (6) evaluations support for the euro. All these changes of the Standard Eurobarometer results are mirrored in relation to the long-run GDP changes of the European Union (EU-28). The third part of the study analyses the four key elements of European mind-sets. In general decision theory and general systems theory, a mind-set is a set of assumptions, beliefs, methods or notations held by one or more people or groups of people. In the field of future studies, the concept and analysis of mind-sets have been discussed in many global studies. From this perspective, it is interesting to elaborate the European mind-set and its status. The study is based on the very latest "The Future of Europe" datasets (September 2017). From these three perspectives, this study is relevant for European integration studies.

A brief description of study design and tasks: This study analyses the European Mind-set in EU-27 countries and in other key regional categories of the European Union in 2017. The study also analyses some changes in the European cognitive mind-set in 2006–2017. In the field of mind-set analysis, the critical issue of mental inertia will be discussed in this study. The study is based on the statistical platform of the European statistical research questionnaire which has some common platform elements in Eurobarometer studies.

Methods: The study is based on the databases of previous Eurobarometer survey studies in 2006–2015 (eurozone, EU-25, EU-28 and other regional sub-categories) and Eurobarometer published in September 2017 (with EU-25 or EU-27 categories). The methods of Eurobarometer studies are conventional survey study research methods and statistical indicator research methods. We compare some pre-



vious key Eurobarometer results with the database of Eurobarometer 2017. The full analysis of four mind-sets is performed with Eurobarometer database of year 2017. Some analyses and conceptualisations are of a pilot-type methodological nature.

**Key Results:** The study provides empirical insights about the European mind-set changes in the context of the global and European economy, especially in 2017, on the basis of the latest European future oriented studies of Eurobarometer research in 2006–2017. The study analyses and presents some results of the changes in the European mind-set in 2006–2017. The Eurobarometer database (EU-27, EU-25 and other EU's regional categories) are sorted in such way that we can analyse the four key elements of the European mind-set in a systematic way and draw some logical conclusions based on the Eurobarometer database of "The Future of Europe". A key result of the study is a novel analysis of four European mind-set categories. These four categories of reporting are global mind-set, collaboration mind-set, virtual mind-set and innovation mind-set.

**The primary interpretations and conclusions:** The present study discusses the innovative and new indicators of European mind-set evaluation (in chapter 5.1.). These indicators are linked to the mind-set analysis with the Eurobarometer indicators. The economic growth in the euro area and mind-set measurements will be combined in the empirical analyses of the study. The analysis of mind-set and public opinion changes and changes of economic growth are reported for the euro area and for EU-27/EU-28 regions. The key challenge is to develop four different mind-set indicators to evaluate economic growth and development. For the concept of a mind-set, we propose four key elements, global mind-set, collaboration mind-set, virtual mind-set and innovation mind-set. We present a full argumentation of selected categories and cognitive mind-sets. The interpretation of new results is a very challenging task because there will be a EU-27 category after the BREXIT process.

**KEYWORDS:** Standard Eurobarometer, "The Future of Europe" database, European Union, public opinion, European mind-set, EU-28 countries, global mind-set, innovation mind-set, virtual mind-set, collaborative mind-set, economic growth, mind-set indicators.

The aim of this study is to report major changes in public opinion in the European Union and some relevant results concerning European citizens' future orientations. We also aim to propose and present some key indicators of European mind-set evaluation (chapter 5.1.). Our contribution in this article is that we link the Eurobarometer indicators to the mind-set analysis. Our objective is to analyse the mind-set changes and key changes of economic growth in the euro area. In our analyses, we pay special attention to positive and negative evaluations and gaps in these positive and negative evaluations of European citizens.

Many corporate leaders and managers need an updated understanding of these management issues: A global mind-set, a virtual mind-set, an innovative mind-set and a collaborative mind-set are all key issues in the changing environment. Corporation leaders and managers need to understand the key issues which are highly relevant for these mind-sets, especially for an innovative mind-set.

Global mind-set is changing the threats of globalisation into opportunities. In a global mind-set, the leaders' dynamic capability is to use a worldwide, broad perspective to comprehend the unexpected trends and opportunities towards realising personal, professional and organisation's goals (Lahiri et al. 2008, Kaivo-oja & Lauraeus 2018, Kaivo-oja 2011).

Innovation mind-set is changing the threats of rapid technological change and scientific discoveries into opportunities. An Innovation mind-set is a mental framework of leaders and decision makers. Dynamic capability is to create the development and implementation of new fresh ideas and to solve problems and, therefore, finally implement new ways to do business and govern policy (Lahiri et al. 2008, Kaivo-oja & Lauraeus 2018, Kaivo-oja 2011).


Virtual mind-set is changing threats of hypercompetition into opportunities. A virtual mind-set

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## Introduction

Figure 1

Mind-sets matter in the fields of European integration policies (modification of Lahiri et al. 2008)



allows top leaders with dynamic capabilities to focus their attention on an organisation's core competencies (Lahiri et al. 2008, Kaivo-oja & Lauraeus 2018).

Collaboration mind-set is changing the threats of globalisation, STI changes and hypercompetition into promising opportunities. A collaboration mind-set as a dynamic capability enables leaders to realise the importance of partners and thereby overcome the communication, cultural and temporal barriers (Lahiri et al. 2008, Kaivo-oja & Lauraeus 2018).

Our target is to present the full argumentation of selected categories and cognitive mind-sets. The study also analyses some key changes and tendencies in the European cognitive mind-set in 2004–2018. In the field of mind-set analysis, the critical issue of mental inertia will be discussed in this study. The study is based on the statistical platform of the European statistical research questionnaire "The Future of Europe", which has some common platform elements in Eurobarometer studies (European Commission 2017). We also analyse conventional Standard Eurobarometer datasets (European Commission 2018) to provide a big picture about changes in public opinion in the European Union.

The study is based on the databases of previous Eurobarometer survey studies in 2004–2018 (EU-28) and Standard Eurobarometer published in September 2018 (with EU-25 or EU-27 categories). The combined methods of the Eurobarometer studies are conventional survey study research methodology. The Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1974. Each survey consists of approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per country. We compare some previous key Eurobarometer results with the database of Eurobarometer 2018.

There has been scientific discussion about the Eurobarometer and its scientific research design. Especially Höpner and Jurczyk (2015) have reviewed previous surveys from 1995 and 2010 and presented some critical points of view. They have noted that the Eurobarometer systemically produces "integrationist" outcomes and there are needs to be critical, if one observes the violations of the rules of good public opinion research. Höpner and Jurczyk (2015, 6) present the rules of a good opinion poll:

1. It must be simple and understandable.
2. It must be non-hypothetical.
3. It must require only knowledge that respondents actually have.

## Theory and methodological framework

4. It must avoid double stimuli.
5. It must avoid unclear terminology.
6. It must not have inexact time references.
7. With multiple items, it must have both negative and positive response options.
8. It must avoid insinuation and leading questions.
9. It must have response options that are balanced, logically complete and free of overlap, and
10. It must avoid contextual effects.

When we elaborate this list of ten rules, we can note that it is not easy to make a perfect survey questionnaire. We have to face this methodological problem in every survey questionnaire research project. Especially when we study opinions, values and mind-sets, we must be fully aware of the restrictions of survey questionnaires. There is always the possibility of ethnocentric biases and measurement problems (see e.g. Leong & Ward 2006). If we expect to find and have a 100% perfect survey questionnaire, very few empirical research articles would be published in the fields social and cultural studies. As Höpner and Jurczyk (2015, 6) note, “single violations will always occur, even in the best opinion polls”. However, we always need critical reflections of the Eurobarometer questionnaire and its questions.

The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys, which have been conducted twice yearly since 1973 across all the member countries of the EEC/EC/EU. Typically, approximately 1,000 persons aged 15 years or older are interviewed in each member country and the exact number varying according to the size of the country. For example, in Germany approximately 1,500 persons are interviewed, but in smaller countries, in Luxemburg, Cyprus and Malta, this figure is 500 persons (Höpner & Jurczyk 2015, 1). One strength of the Eurobarometer survey is that several standard questions recur over long periods of time. This study heavily relies on this strength of the Eurobarometer. Another strength of the Eurobarometer is that it also allows country-by-country comparisons. That is why various empirical studies have been made relying on the Eurobarometer.

Our approach in this study can be compared to the previous survey study approach of Schwartz (1994, 2003, 2006), who presented seven cultural value dimensions (hierarchy, embeddedness, harmony, egalitarian commitment, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and mastery). Another similar kind of approach was Geert Hofstede's (1979, 1980, 2001, Hofstede & Hofstede 2005) six dimensions of cultural differences (power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation and indulgence vs. restraint). Our theoretical platform approach introduces four key elements of “European Mind-set”: Global mind-set, virtual mind-set, innovation mind-set and collaboration mind-set. This approach can be linked to the contribution of Lahiri, Perez-Nordtvedt and Renn (2008) and to previous global and regional mind-set analyses (see e.g. Naisbitt 2006). All of these three approaches are based on survey data analysis. Of course, like in all similar kinds of studies, there is a lot of room for improvement in survey data, questionnaire designs and critical interpretations.

The analysis of four mind-sets is performed with the 2017 Eurobarometer database. Some analyses are of a pilot-type of methodological nature. “Pilot-type of methodological nature” means that no one has presented a similar methodological solution before this solution. For example, (1) gap analysis, (2) the integration of the Standard Eurobarometer data and GDP index data, (3) combo changes analyses and (4) mind-set analyses based on the Eurobarometer data are these kinds of pilot-type analyses. The study provides empirical insights about the European mind-set changes in the context of global and European economy especially in 2017 (“The Future of

Europe”, September 2017) on the basis of the latest European future oriented studies of Eurobarometer research in 2004–2018. The study analyses and presents some results of the changes in the European mind-set in 2004–2018. A key result of the study is a novel analysis of four European mind-set categories. These four categories of reporting are global mind-set, virtual mind-set, collaboration mind-set and innovation mind-set.

## Public opinion about the key issues of the European Union

In this chapter, we present some key empirical analyses of public opinion in the European Union. In Fig. 2, we report results about trust in national governments and parliaments and trust in the European Union.

This analysis covers the years 2004–2018. We can observe that, in the long run, trust in the European Union has decreased from 50% to 40%. Trust in national governments and in parliaments has also decreased in the period of 2004–2014, but in recent years, 2015–2018, trust in national political institutions has slightly increased. Trust level trends in national government and trust in national parliament have been pretty much at the same level in the survey evaluation period of the Eurobarometer. In the last Eurobarometer study in 2018, the situation was that an increasing majority of Europeans distrust national governments (61% “tend not to trust”, +2 percentage points since autumn 2017) and national parliaments (60%, +2). They also “tend not to trust” the European Union but to a lesser extent (48%, unchanged). We can say that confidence in the European Union and national political institutions could be at a better level.


In Fig. 3, we have analysed gaps between trust in the EU and national trust evaluations of European citizens. This analysis provides information about the difference in European and national policies. Key finding is that Europeans trust more in the European Union than in their national political institutions, but after 2009 this the leading trust factor of the European Union has shrunk. Key finding is that trust in the European Union was much higher than trust in national institutions in 2004–2008 than in the period of 2009–2018. The difference between trust in the EU and national trust variables has fallen considerably in 2009–2018. Considerable fall in trust ended in 2012 and more balanced trust trend in the European Union was reached in 2012–2018.

In Fig. 4, we report key trends of image of the European Union in 2006–2018.

We can say that the image of the European Union has deteriorated since the beginning of the evaluation period in autumn 2006. In total, a positive image was estimated by approx. 50% of interviewed European citizens but it fell to 30% in 2011. Image improved slightly to a higher level after 2013, when approx. 40% of the citizens rated the totally positive image. Correspondingly, totally negative image estimate in 2006 was evaluated by 15% of European citizens. At the turn of the year 2012 and 2013, the image was totally negative for 30% of Europeans. In this case, the EU’s image is at its worst. After that, the image has returned to a more positive level, with an estimated 21% of “totally negative” citizen assessments in spring 2018. In spring 2018, a majority of Europeans have a positive image of the EU (40%). Their proportion continues to exceed those who have a neutral image of the EU (37%), while just above a fifth of Europeans have a negative image of the EU (21%). These image results have remained perfectly unchanged since spring 2017.


In Fig. 5, we report the gap analysis concerning citizens who had a totally positive minus totally negative image of the EU.

Our gap analysis reveals considerable changes in the public image of the European Union. The bottom level of the image was reached in 2012–2013. After these image crisis years, the image of the European Union has improved.




**Figure 2**

Trust in national governments and parliaments and in the European Union (% trend to trust). Source: European Commission 2018



**Figure 3**

Gaps of trust: EU vs. national government and EU vs. national parliament, autumn 2004 – spring 2018. Source: European Commission 2018. Note: This gap analysis informs about EU trust in relation to national institutions



**Figure 4**

The image of the EU. Totally positive, neutral, totally negative, don't know. Source: European Commission 2018

In Fig. 6, we report trends of the leading concern at the EU level. These trend analyses reveal considerable changes in the political environment of the European Union.

The key changes in long-term trends have been the following: (1) Since 2011, concerns about the state of member states' public finances have fallen; (2) after 2013, there has been a reduction in unemployment concerns; (3) after 2012, concerns about immigration have strengthened strongly, (4) after 2014, worries about terrorism have increased among European citizens. A fifth finding is that Europeans have not been very much worried about Europe's position in the world and climate

Figure 5

Long-run image of the EU. Gap analysis: Gap = Totally positive image assessments (%) minus totally negative image assessments (5) of the EU. Source: European Commission 2018





Figure 6

The most important issues facing the EU at the moment. Source: European Commission 2018



change, even though these issues also show a slight increase in concern over long-term trend analysis. These changed citizens' concerns are certainly influenced by the European Union's policy both directly and indirectly. The political agenda of the EU is different today than it was in 2011. Certainly, the focus of migration and terrorism matters is higher than it was in 2011 in the EU.

In spring 2018, immigration remains the leading concern of Europeans at the EU level, with 38% of all mentions (-1 percentage point since autumn 2017). At 29%, terrorism remains in the second



position of concern at the EU level, although it has lost ground since autumn 2017 (-9, and -15 since spring 2017). The economic issues lag behind, even though they have registered slight increases since autumn 2017. The economic situation is in third place (18%, +1), ahead of the state of Member States' public finances in fourth (17%, +1) and unemployment in fifth (14%, +1).

In Fig. 7, we report the concerns of the most important issues in national policies in the EU region. With regard to these national concerns, we can state the following: (1) Unemployment has been a major concern at the national level in the long term, but worries about unemployment have fallen since the spring of 2013 in the EU countries; (2) the economic situation has been a major concern in the EU countries in the long run evaluations; (4) other concerns such as health and social security, rising prices and pensions have since 2014 been on the same levels, (5) concerns for price levels and health and social security have fallen in a long-term perspective. Concerns about immigration have risen in the national evaluations of the EU. In autumn 2018, in the first position at the EU level with 38% of mentions, immigration is seen as the most important issue facing the EU in 21 Member States (up from 14 in autumn 2017). Immigration is the second most important concern in all the remaining Member States, except Portugal, where it comes in fifth place (with 16% of the mentions).




Figure 7

The most important issues facing EU countries at the moment.  
Source: European Commission 2018

In autumn 2018, terrorism is mentioned by 29% of Europeans and is in first position in seven countries. In these countries, it reaches its highest scores in Lithuania (49%), Cyprus (44%) and Ireland (40%). However, terrorism is also much cited, although in second position, in the Czech Republic (47%), Bulgaria and Poland (both 42%) and Latvia (41%). Overall, it is the second most important issue in 15 Member States. In Germany, terrorism stands in equal second place with the state of the Member States' public finances, with 24% of the mentions.

In autumn 2018, with 18% of the mentions at the EU level, the economic situation is in third position: it is mentioned by at least a quarter of the population in Greece (30%), Cyprus (26%) and Spain (25%). In fourth position at the EU level, the state of Member States' public finances is mentioned by 17% of EU citizens, most strikingly in the Netherlands (34%), Germany (24%), and Austria and Portugal (both 22%). High proportions of citizens also mentioned this item in Greece (27%) and Finland (22%). In fifth position, unemployment is mentioned by 14% of the respondents at the EU level. It reaches its highest score in Italy (28%), where it is in second place. In equal sixth



place at the EU level (level with climate change) with 11% of the mentions, the EU's influence in the world reaches its highest score in the Netherlands Gross domestic product at market prices where it is the third answer given (24%). Climate change reaches its highest score in Sweden, where it is in second position (29%). Climate change is in third place in Finland (25%), Denmark (24%) and Ireland (15%, equal with rising prices/inflation/cost of living), and it is also mentioned by more than a fifth of respondents in the Netherlands (22%). In autumn 2018, other items are mentioned by 10% or less at the EU level.


## Public opinion and economic growth in EU-28 region

This chapter provides integrated analysis of public opinion and economic growth in the EU-28 region. Integrated analysis means that we present *combos of EU public opinion data and EU economic growth data*. A combo (or combination chart) is a chart that plots multiple sets of data using two different chart types. A typical combo chart uses a line and a column. The data base of these analyses is the Eurobarometer report in 2018 (European Commission 2018 and GDP index data base of the Eurostat (Chain linked volumes, index 2010=100, Eurostat 2018). The integrations of these two key European datasets provide new information about recent socio-economic changes in the European Union. Analyses are reported about (1) economic situation, (2) European economic situation, (3) European economic crisis recovery (the impacts of crisis on jobs), (4) euro-optimism (or pessimism), (5) euro area attitudes and (6) euro currency attitudes. We have constructed gap analyses for these variables. The gap index data is constructed by calculating the totally positive assessments minus the totally negative assessments.

In Fig. 8, we report trend evaluations about economic situation and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.

Figure 8

Economic situation (gap index) and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2004–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018



These Eurobarometer analyses reveal that economic situation analysis in the Standard Eurobarometer data and GDP index has been interlinked in historical trend analysis. When in autumn 2008 the economic situation was evaluated to be weakest, the GDP index was also at the lowest level. Gradually, both important indices have improved and they reached about the same level in 2017 that they had in 2007. Recovery from financial crisis has taken about 10 years.

In Fig. 9, we report trend evaluations about European economic situation and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.




Figure 9

European economic situation and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2004–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018

This empirical data based analysis reveals that European economic situation analysis in the Standard Eurobarometer data and GDP index has been interlinked in historical trend analysis. Gradually, both important indices have improved, and they reached about the same level in 2017 that they had in 2004. This analysis is a little bit different compared to the previous analysis because there was an additional period of economic euro-pessimism in 2010–2011, which we were not able to observe in the previous index analysis. The recovery from the financial crisis has taken about 10 years.

In Fig. 10, we report trend evaluations about European economic crisis recovery and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.




Figure 10


European economic crisis recovery and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2009–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018

This analysis does not show a clear linkage between the European economic crisis recovery data and GDP index development. Especially in spring 2012, the results of Standard Eurobarometer were extremely negative. In this historical point, the lack of confidence and disbelief among Europeans was at its peak. Restoring faith to European economic gain has taken a long time.

In Fig. 11, we report trend evaluations about euro-optimism and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.

Figure 11

Euro-optimism and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2007–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018



This Standard Eurobarometer analysis reveals that Europe’s bleak years were in 2011–2013. In this case, the mind-sets of Europeans were more tinted with pessimistic shades than optimism. Another moment of pessimism can be observed in spring 2016 and autumn 2016.

In Fig. 12, we report trend evaluations about euro area attitudes and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.


Attitudes towards the euro area have clearly followed economic growth development in Europe. As the economy has grown strongly, the attitude towards the euro area has also become a positive one.

In Fig. 13, we report trend evaluations about the euro currency attitudes and GDP index development in the EU-28 region.

Furthermore, the attitudes towards the euro currency have clearly followed economic growth development in Europe. As the economy has grown strongly, the attitude towards the euro area has also become a positive one. It is interesting to observe that attitudes towards the euro cur-

Figure 12

Euro area attitudes and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2004–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018






Figure 13

Euro currency attitudes and GDP index development in the EU-28 region, years 2004–2018. Sources: European Commission 2018, Eurostat 2018

rency were very positive in 2004–2009, but in 2010–2013 there was a period of very negative euro attitudes. The attitude to euro currency has become more positive after spring 2013. In autumn 2018, the attitude towards the euro currency reached the same level as in autumn 2009.

In the field of future studies, the concept and analysis of the mind-set have been discussed in many global studies (Naisbitt 2006, Lahiri et al. 2008, Kaivo-oja and Lauraeus 2018). From this perspective, it is interesting to elaborate the European mind-set and its status. This chapter 5 is based on “The Future of Europe” datasets (European Commission 2017). From this perspective, this part of the study is relevant for European integration studies. The objective of this study is to present the novel analyses of four European mind-set categories. These four categories of reporting are (1) global mind-set, (2) collaboration mind-set, (3) virtual mind-set and (4) innovation mind-set.

The competitive landscape is a key element for the European integration environment. Globalisation, hypercompetition and rapid technical change create key preconditions for the European Integration environment. The key challenge for leaders is to change the threats of competitive landscape into opportunities. The role of human mind-sets is very important in this respect. As we know, the mind matters (Lahiri et al. 2008). A global mind-set or the ability to view the world using a broad perspective converts globalisation threats into growth opportunities by thinking beyond geographic boundaries, valuing integration across borders and appreciating regional and cultural diversity. An innovation mind-set is a mental framework that fosters development and the implementation of new ideas. A virtual mind-set, or the ability of managers to hand over their companies’ activities to external providers, turns hypercompetition into prospects for growth by facilitating flexibility and responsiveness. Finally, a collaboration mind-set means willingness allowing companies or corporations to engage in business and other partnerships. A collaborative mind-set integrates all other mind-sets which can lead to synergy by business complementarities (Lahiri et al. 2008). We can conclude that these four critical mind-sets to manage technological changes and scientific discoveries. Some of them are disruptive. The ability to change

## Mind-set study

## Global mind-set: pilot results

threats into opportunities is a critical asset in the disruption and competition conditions (Lahiri et al. 2008, Krupp and Schoemaker 2014).

On the basis of the dataset of "The Future of Europe", we can report an analysis of the global mind-set (Fig. 14).


According to First global mind-set analysis: The major global challenges are (1) Social equality 45%, (2) Protecting the environment 35%, (3) Free trade and market economy 23%, (4) Cultural diversity 19% and (5) Traditions 13%.

On the basis of dataset of "The Future of Europe", we can report second analysis of global mind-set of Europeans (Fig. 15).

The key result of the global mind-set analysis is: In the European global mind-set, social equality and solidarity and environmental protection are the dominating mind-set in relation to free trade/market economy. Cultural diversity and traditions are less dominating mind-set items in relation to free trade/market economy.


**Figure 14**

First global mind-set analysis. Major global challenges. Source: European Commission 2017



**Figure 15**

Second global mind-set analysis. Major global challenges. Source: European Commission 2017




On the basis of the dataset of "The Future of Europe", we can report an analysis of the virtual mind-set (Fig. 16).

On the basis of the dataset of "The Future of Europe", we can report the second operationalisation of the virtual mind-set (Fig. 17).

Virtual mind-set: European virtual mind-set is stronger at home use than in work use and working conditions.

On the basis of the dataset of "The Future of Europe", we can report the first operationalisation of the collaboration mind-set (Fig. 18).

According to the first collaboration mind-set analysis: Most of the countries have a totally positive view (70%), a somewhat positive view (54%) and a very positive view (15%). Very few countries have a very negative view (6%), but some countries have a somewhat negative (21%), or totally negative view (27%).



## Virtual mind-set

## Collaboration mind-set

Figure 16

First virtual mind-set analysis. The use of Internet at work and home. Source: European Commission 2017




Figure 17

Second virtual mind-set analysis. Use of the Internet at work and home. Relative use: Home vs. work. Relative index analyses. Source: European Commission 2017

On the basis of the dataset of “The Future of Europe”, we can report the second operationalisation of the collaboration mind-set (Fig. 19).

The key result of collaborative mind-set analysis is: European citizens are mostly positive in relation EU-28, and the relation of very positive/very negative is 2.5, the relation of somewhat positive/somewhat negative is 2.57, totally positive/totally negative is 2.56, positive collaborative mind-set is quite strong.


## Innovation mind-set

On the basis of the dataset of “The Future of Europe”, we can report the first analysis of the innovation mind-set (Fig. 20).

The key result of innovation mind-set analysis is: In general, Europeans consider themselves as tolerant citizens.


**Figure 18**

First collaboration mind-set analysis. Positive or negative view about EU-28. Source: European Commission 2017



**Figure 19**

Second collaboration mind-set analysis. Positive or negative view about EU-28. Relational index analyses. Source: European Commission 2017








Figure 20

First innovation mind-set analysis. Tolerance and openness to others. Source: European Commission 2017




Figure 21

Second innovation mind-set analysis. Tolerance and openness to others. Relational index analysis. Source: European Commission 2017

In this study, we have presented and reported three different analyses, which were based on Standard Eurobarometer (European Commission 2018) and “The Future of Europe” data (European Commission 2017).

— The first analysis was a historical analysis of the changes in the European public opinion in general. We analysed the development of confidence and trust vis-à-vis the European Union and the national political institutions in general. We also analyse the development of the image of the EU and general concerns of European citizens at European and national levels. The second analysis linked the analysis of the six key barometer variables to economic growth analysis.

## Conclusions

- Our combo analyses (combined data charts) revealed that the moods of the European people seem to closely follow the development and changes in economic growth performance. However, there is a need to make more statistical and scientific analyses in this European policy issue, at least, and we need more statistical regression and correlation analyses, which would be worth conducting another research article. When the economy is doing well, the mood improves. If, however, economic development is weaker, people's mood sinks, and pessimism dominates the European mind-set. This kind of sociocultural processes can be observed when we look at our combo analysis. The Eurobarometer analysis also revealed that the atmosphere has not followed the evolution of economic growth completely linearly but has rather shown periods of pessimism and barometer estimates that have remained exceptionally negative. It has been taking time to restore confidence and trust back after economic and financial crisis after 2007.
- The third analysis presented the mind-set analysis on the basis of "The Future of Europe" datasets. This research was experimental in nature but showed that Eurobarometer data offers interesting opportunities for broad and interesting European mind-set research.
- Many policymakers, corporate leaders and managers need an updated understanding of management issues: A global mind-set, a virtual mind-set, an innovative mind-set and a collaborative mind-set are all key issues in the European Integration environment. Cognitive skills and mind-sets of global leaders are an important part of new management thinking. We can note that the awareness of mind-sets and cognitive models is *significant* for European integration policy. There is a need to conduct more research in this field.

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### **JARI KAIVO-OJA**

**Dr., research director,, adjunct prof.**

Finland Future Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku

#### **Address**

Tel. +358 41 753 0244

E-mail: jari.kaivo-oja@utu.fi

### **THERESA LAURAEÚS**

**Dr., senior researcher**

Finland Future Research Centre, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku

#### **Fields of research interests**

PhD (Information System Sciences), M.Sc. (Interactive Multimedia, Growing Enterprise Strategies, Econ)

#### **Address**

Tel. +358 40 353 8296

E-mail: theresa.lauraeus@utu.fi

## About the authors